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Preparing for the future: development of an µantifragile¶ methodology that 
complements scenario planning by omitting causation. 
 
     Abstract 
This paper demonstrates that the Intuitive Logics method of 
scenario planning emphasises the causal unfolding of future 
events and that this emphasis limits its ability to aid preparation 
for the future, for example by giving a misleading impression as 
WRWKHXVHIXOQHVVRIµZHDNVLJQDOV¶RUµHDUO\ZDUQLQJV¶. We argue 
for the benefits of an alternative method that views uncertainty as 
originating from indeterminism. We develop and illustrate an 
µantifragile¶ approach to preparing for the future and present it as 
a step-by-step, non-deterministic methodology that can be used 
as a replacement for, or as a complement to, the causally-focused 
approach of scenario planning. 
 
Keywords: scenario planning; Intuitive Logics; causality; indeterminism; 
fragility; uncertainty 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Scenario planning exercises are increasingly common in the private sector and are 
increasingly underpinned by academic research [1, 2 p.461, 3, 4 p.335]. While this 
increased popularity has been accompanied by a proliferation of approaches [5], it is 
widely accepted that most organizations employing scenario planning use an approach 
based on what is known as µ,QWXLWLYH /RJLFV¶ ,/ >  p.9, 7 p.162]. Here, 
management team members are facilitated in thinking of the causal unfolding of 
chains of events into the future. 
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However, quesWLRQV KDYH EHHQ UDLVHG DERXW ,/¶V effectiveness in preparing an 
organization for the future. In particular, much has recently been written highlighting 
its limited ability to deal with uncertainty - particularly its ability to assist in preparing 
for µVXUSULVH¶ events [8-10]. 
 
In discussing this limitation, we present two interpretations of the origins of 
uncertainty. One view associates uncertainty with a difficulty in identifying and 
predicting causes and their effects but, nevertheless, still sees events as determined by 
causes. This is contrasted with an alternative view of uncertainty that rejects cause 
altogether and views events as subject to an absolute form of indeterminism. The 
distinction between these two interpretations is important because it allows evaluation 
of the appropriateness and efficacy of the methods currently used to carry out scenario 
planning. 
 
Our paper demonstrates that the basic IL methodology is based closely on the 
deterministic interpretation of uncertainty but that a recent augmentation, using 
µbackwards logic¶, has, to a degree, broadened this base assumption. We argue that, in 
order to provide a full recognition of uncertainty, methods and approaches that are 
non-deterministic must now be developed. In other words, scenario planning must, in 
our view, weaken its dependence on causation. In the latter sections of the paper we 
develop and present a new approach for preparing for the future without recourse to 
causality. First, we develop our arguments on conceptualisations of uncertainty. 
 
2. Scenario planning and the nature of uncertainty 
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There are two major interpretations of the origins of uncertainty. One interpretation 
views it as the result of µRQWRORJLFDO UDQGRPQHVV¶ and this is associated with the 
emergence of quantum mechanics in the early 20
th
 century. Here, observable 
phenomena are seen as subject to an irreducible and absolute form of chance - as in 
Brownian motion in physics [11]. Under this view, prediction is impossible. Such 
indeterminism LVDUHMHFWLRQRIWKHYHU\QRWLRQRIFDXVHWKHRQO\µFDXVH¶EHLQJFKDQFH
itself. A particular combination of factors may result in one outcome on one occasion 
and a completely different outcome on another. Hacking, a philosopher of science, 
FRPPHQWHG UHJDUGLQJ WKH DGYHQW RI WKLV YLHZ WKDW µ&DXVDOLW\ ORQJ WKH EDVWLRQ RI
metaphysics, was toSSOHGRUDWOHDVWWLOWHG¶ [12].   
 
An alternative interpretation of the origins of uncertainty views it as the result of 
µHSLVWHPRORJLFDO UDQGRPQHVV¶ This viewpoint RULJLQDWHG LQ  IURP /DSODFH¶V
scientific determinism [13, 14, 15 p.37]. Under this view, uncertainty stems from the 
difficulty associated with identifying, unravelling and measuring causes, but events 
are nevertheless still seen as determined by cause. Uncertainty results from the 
inadequacy of the procedures we use to uncover cause, which can have limited 
efficacy, even ex-post. Nevertheless, this deterministic view suggests that if we are 
able to identify relevant causes at a sufficiently early stage in their development we 
can alter the expected outcome by changing the causes. Under this view, each future 
outcome results from a specific set of causes and is determined by them. 
 
Taleb [16 p.198] refers to these alternative interpretations DV µWUXH UDQGRPQHVV¶ DQG
µGHWHUPLQLVWLF FKDRV¶, respectively. He implies that there is no functional difference 
between them if it is, in practice, impossible to locate relevant causes. If we believe 
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that events are entirely determined by causes but that these causes cannot be identified 
in advance (or, indeed, even retrospectively), then uncertainty should, by default, be 
considered to be ontological in origin.  
 
This distinction between the two interpretations of the origins of uncertainty, one 
which emphasises determinism and one which rejects it, is important because it 
enables a nuanced evaluation of the methods used for scenario planning. As shown by 
Shackle [17], deterministic approaches to the future are of limited value in contexts 
characterised by novelty and surprise. In fact, a OLPLWHGDELOLW\WRGHDOZLWKµVXUSULVH¶
events has been identified as a deficiency in the currently most-commonly employed 
method of scenario planning, IL [8-10]. 
 
To overcome this limitation, approaches to scenario planning should, we believe, 
accept indeterminism as a complement to an acceptance of µFDXVH¶$Vcommented on 
by Loasby [18 p.2-4] in relation to the hole in the ozone layer discovered in the 1980s, 
any human notion of cause can only ever be provisional and tentative in nature. The 
fluorine compounds that caused the damage to the ozone were earlier thought to be 
inert. It only later transpired that this inertness, established in the laboratory setting, 
did not apply in the ozone layer. This limited capacity to generalise cause from 
studies in the experimental settings of the natural sciences is indicative of much larger 
difficulties in ascribing cause in the social realm.  
 
It is not always possible to know the extent to which experienced reality is genuinely 
subject to indeterminism stemming from µWUXHUDQGRPQHVV¶FRPSDUHGWRWKHH[WHQWWR
which it simply appears so because of our limited ability to identify cause. Phillips 
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[51 p.5] provides an example illustrating this difficulty: Biologists studying predator-
prey  relationships thought that the H[WLQFWLRQRIDVSHFLHVPXVWDOZD\VKDYHDµFDXVH¶
and could not understand how it could happen to a predator when its prey was 
plentiful. They later realised, however, that extinction can happen for no apparent 
reason. 
 
By adopting an ontological interpretation of uncertainty - and assuming 
indeterminism - we can augment scenario methodology to take account of this 
indeterminism. By contrast, the cause-and-effect logic of IL results in the making of 
multiple causal assumptions and so contains multiple opportunities for error and does 
not take account of indeterminism. 
 
The later sections of this paper outline 7DOHE¶V DOWHUQDWLYH µ$QWLIUDJLOH¶ $) [19] 
approach to aid preparation for the future. We will show that use of the AF 
conceptualisation can enhance preparation for a future of deep uncertainty without 
making recourse to causal assumptions. We develop and document AF techniques 
and methods as a complement to, or as an alternative to, a formalised scenario-
planning procedure. 
 
Prior to this, however, we (i) substantiate our claim as to the deterministic nature of 
IL, and (ii) evidence the negative effect of this determinism on ,/¶V ability to deal 
with uncertainty. The next VHFWLRQGHVFULEHV ,/¶s inherent determinism and some of 
its negative effects. 
 
3. Determinism in scenario planning and its effects 
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3.1 The determinism of the Intuitive Logics scenario methodology 
 
Postma and Liebl [7] have provided a basic outline of the IL approach to scenario 
planning. In the first part of the IL process, WKH µGULYLQJ IRUFHV¶ RU µFDXVDO IDFWRUV¶
assumed to determine (degree of) change in the future are classified into the three 
categories of µFRQVWDQW¶ µSUHGHWHUPLQHG¶ RU µXQFHUWDLQ¶ TKH µFRQVWDQW¶ JURXS RI
factors are characterised by their lack of change and represent a continuation of the 
SUHVHQW )RU µSUHGHWHUPLQHG¶ IDFWRUV RI change, change is assumed to occur but the 
change is known and predictable. The third category of factors is for those which are 
µXQFHUWDLQ¶ ,W LV WKLV WKLUG FDWHJRU\ WKDW LV PRVW LPSRUWDQW DV LW LV from these 
uncertainties that a range of scenarios are produced in the IL process. 
 
The driving forces are clustered based on degree of interdependence and the two 
clusters considered to have both (i) the highest uncertainty and (ii) the highest degree 
of potential impact on the focal issue of concern to the scenario planners are utilised 
as the basis of the two-dimensional scenario space (Fig. 1) from which four scenarios 
are usually created, one for each quadrant comprising the space [8]. These four 
scenarios are developed from the cluster contents in the forP RI µSHQ-SLFWXUHV¶ >10 
p.363] ± narratives in which a chain of causation is described resulting in an µend 
state¶, or ultimate outcome. A final step of the process examines the robustness of the 
organization¶VVWUDWHJ\ against the developed scenarios [9 p.817]. 
 
Indeterminism is incorporated into this process through the acknowledgement of 
multiple possible futures. However, each one of these futures is individually tied to a 
specific set of causes and effects and is entirely determined by these causes and 
effects. Each scenario is deterministic in its own right, even if the overall process is 
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non-deterministic since four scenarios emerge rather than one. A specific unfolding 
future is a result of an interdependent VHWRIFDXVHVDµFDXVDOFKDLQ¶ 
 
The IL scenario generation process generates rich, qualitative, and engaging stories of 
these individually-determined futures - based on a causal logic. The resulting 
QDUUDWLYH UHSUHVHQWV D µVHTXHQFH RI LQWHUDFWLQJ HYHQWV QHHGHG WR UHDFK WKH VFHQDULR¶ 
outcome [21 p.224, 22]. AVYDQW¶.ORRVWHUDQGYDQ$VVHOW>23 p.23] specifically state, 
WKHIRXUVFHQDULRµVWRULHV¶UHVXOWLQJIURPDQIL scenario-planning exercise are, at their 
heart, µEDVHG RQ D FDXVH DQG HIIHFW ORJLF¶ It is this logic, and its associated 
determinism, that places IL within the categorisation of a deterministic, 
epistemological interpretation of the origins of uncertainty. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.2 Deleterious effects of a deterministic focus in scenario planning 
 
,/¶V JURXQGLQJ LQ WKH GHWHUPLQistic, epistemological view of uncertainty manifests 
itself in a dependence on narratives describing chains of cause-and-effect logic. This 
focus has a number of effects on its efficacy in relation to uncertainty, as will be 
shown in this section. 
 
Taleb [16] has given the human tendency to over-emphasise the role of causal factors 
LQDQ\SDUWLFXODURXWFRPHWKHQDPHRI µ1DUUDWLYH)DOODF\¶ 1)$QH[Dmple of NF 
provided by Taleb [16] is the way in which history is written. When living through or 
participating in an historical incident the course of unfolding events will seem very 
complex and messy. Yet, when reading back through the history of the same incident 
as later documented by the historian, the eventual outcome appears clearly determined 
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by an identifiable set of more-or-less important causes [25 p.87-108]. Participants in 
IL engage in an analogous process when constructing scenarios. 
 
Taleb argues that, in contrast to the neat categorisation and ranking of causes by the 
historian, outcomes are much less determined by causes than they appear in the 
history books. As Taleb [16 p.63-64] comments, narratives bind facts together making 
them more easily remembered and prominent in the minds of readers, as well as 
making them easier to understand. 
 
IL uses narrative to enhance the plausibility of the sequence of events and actions 
within individual scenarios. This is a commonly asserted benefit of the narrative-
based approach to scenario planning incorporated in IL. Storytelling via the cause-
and-effect sequences within the IL version of scenario planning may be a natural way 
of making sense of the world as evidenced by the similar use of narrative in the 
decision-making processes of judges and juries as shown by Wagenaar [24]. In this 
way, the IL methodology can, it is argued, act to µPLQLPLVe unpleasant surprises¶> 
p.224] by using the natural pre-disposition to construct and think in narrative terms in 
order to raise the prominence and plausibility of futures not previously considered. 
 
However, the IL scenario process can also have the opposite effect of increasing 
susceptibility to unpleasant surprises. The IL process enhances the plausibility of 
futures other than a µbest guess¶ future that is often assumed by decision-makers, but 
it only does so for those scenarios considered as part of the scenario-planning 
exercise. The corollary is that unconsidered futures, which are much larger in number, 
are likely to be diminished in terms of their plausibility. 
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IL therefore has the effect of both broadening and narrowing decision-PDNHUV¶
perspective at the same time. However, since the IL process typically results in just 
four scenarios, whereas the number of unconsidered scenarios is infinite in number 
(and, therefore, much more likely to be the source of the actual future that transpires), 
on balance its perspective-narrowing effect may be considerably greater than its 
perspective-broadening effect. This narrowing will result directly from the 
employment of narratives describing chains of causation, which in turn stems from 
,/¶VJURXQGLQJLQDGHWHUPLQLVWLFHSLVWHPRORJLFDOYLHZRIXQFHUWDLQW\ 
 
The very act of producing scenarios can give participants undue confidence in their 
ability to predict [8-9, 26] even when the scenario-planning process is explicitly 
couched in terms of a non-predictive exercise. Drawing on Tversky and Kahneman 
[27], Wright and Goodwin [9 p.818] refer to this effect DVWKHµsLPXODWLRQKHXULVWLF¶ 
The simulation heuristic comes about in particular because of the so-called 
µFRQMXQFWLon fallDF\¶ZKLFKLV directly implicated in the use of narratives to describe 
chains of causation DQG WKHUHIRUH WR ,/¶V grounding in the epistemological 
interpretation of uncertainty. As Kahneman [28 p.159-160] has shown, richer and 
more detailed descriptions of the causal intersections of several events are, 
psychologically, seen as more likely than the base probabilities of the constituent 
events. By the formal probability laws, the intersection of the occurrence of two 
independent events can only ever be lower than the probability of occurrence of either 
one individually.  
 
 10 
The simulation heuristic results in a greater perceived plausibility and likelihood of 
occurrence for considered scenarios. In this way, the perspective-narrowing effect that 
results from the very act of creating specific narratives that are based on a sub-section 
of identified driving forces is magnified. This can act to make organizations and their 
PDQDJHUVPRUHUDWKHUWKDQOHVVVXVFHSWLEOHWRµVXUSULVH¶IXWXUHVQRWconsidered as part 
of the focal scenarios. 
 
Because of the emphasis on narrative and cause in the IL process, the impression can 
develop that the way to deal with uncertainty is simply to identify the unfolding of 
constructed causal chains at as early a stage as possible, for example by identifying 
early µtrigger events¶, or µZHDNVLJQDOV¶ [29] RUµHDUO\ZDUQLQJV¶ - and then to put in 
place contingencies in order to mitigate the unfolding of an undesirable future or take 
early advantage of the unfolding of a desirable future. This view is prominent in the 
recent scenario-planning literature [30-31]. 
  
An ontological view of uncertainty, by contrast, views outcomes as resulting from 
stochastic processes that are not connected with causation. This conceptualisation 
implies that scanning IRU µZHDN VLJQDOV¶ RU µHDUO\ ZDUQLQJV¶ will lead to misplaced 
confidence in the unfolding of the particular focal futures described in the constructed 
scenarios.  
 
3.3 A recent attempt to overcome determinism in scenario planning: the backwards 
logic methodology 
 
One attempt to broaden the range of scenarios developed within the general IL 
methodology LV:ULJKWDQG*RRGZLQ¶V>@ Backwards Logic Method (BLM). BLM is 
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an adaptation and augmentation of IL designed to broaden out the range of scenarios 
consLGHUHGµZKLOH, at the same time, retaining the essential focus on causality within 
the process of scenario construction¶> p.638, emphasis added]. Within the BLM, the 
focus is shifted onto understanding the causes of plausible changes to the 
organization¶s achievement of its objectives. 
 
Essentially, BLM has three steps, with an iterative fourth step designed to consolidate 
the process and ensure that extreme events are considered. Step 1 identifies the 
organization¶VNH\REMHFWLYHVVWHSLPDJLQHVDUDQJe of extreme outcomes for those 
objectives, and step 3 establishes the factors that could cause these changes (identified 
in step 2) in the achievement of objectives. Crucially, step 3 retains the focus on 
building narratives that result in a causal chain, albeit one that runs backwards from 
the future achievement, or otherwise, of organizational objectives to the events 
causing that variation in achievement. 
 
As evident in our description of step 3, BLM still imposes an arrow of causation but 
sees this arrow running backwards in time - identifying the reverse causal chain that 
results in the over-achievement or under-achievement of objectives. As described in 
section two, such an arrow of causation, or unfolding causal chain is, from Taleb¶V
viewpoint, a likely µQDUUDWLYH IDOODF\¶ whose very construction excludes 
indeterminism and enhances a view of the future as determined. This is true regardless 
of in which direction the arrow, or chain of causation, travels. 
 
Because of the continued dependence on narratives describing chains of causation the 
considered scenarios will still gain in prominence at the expense of those left 
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unconsidered. The effect may be an increase, rather than a decrease, in susceptibility 
WR µXQSOHDVDQW VXUSULVHV¶ WKRXJK WKLV HIIHFW is likely to be less prevalent with BLM 
than under IL EHFDXVH RI WKH IRUPHU¶V LQitial focus on extreme changes in the 
DFKLHYHPHQWRIDQRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VNH\REMHFWLYHV In fact, the originators of the BLM 
approach were aware of the perspective-limiting bias in standard applications of IL 
when they proposed BLM and, for this reason included in it suggestions to bolster the 
process to ensure it is not one solely based on describing the unfolding of causal 
chains [9, p.821].  
 
Nevertheless, the BLM approach retains a philosophical grounding that is closer to 
the deterministic, epistemological view of uncertainty than the ontological. It still 
implies that the way to SUHSDUH IRU µextreme¶ HYHQWV is through an identification of 
what might cause them. Because of its continued grounding in the deterministic, 
epistemological view, specific sets of causes are still assumed to result in a single 
outcome (under-achievement, achievement, or over-achievement of an objective).  
 
4. Preparing for the future without recourse to cause: Antifragility 
 
The previous sections of this paper have shown IL to be grounded in a deterministic, 
epistemological view of the origin of uncertainty. The negative consequences of this 
have been discussed and it has been shown that a recent augmentation of IL, BLM, 
attempts to mitigate these problems. We next turn to consider and evaluate alternative, 
non-scenario-based, approaches to aid preparation for the future.  
 
7DOHE¶V µAntifragile¶ (AF) approach to preparation for an uncertain future [19] does 
not require causal constructions of what may, or may not, initiate a particular future 
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outcome and so attenuates our potential fallibility in identification of cause, discussed 
earlier. In short, causal attributions cannot be misplaced if none are made. 
 
In switching emphasis onto what makes the organization (or individual) µfragile¶ or 
sensitive to the future, AF may initially be considered similar to BLM. For example, 
BLM like AF seeks to identify the factors that may result in a failure to meet 
objectives and contains techniques to avoid misattributing cause [9 p.823]. However, 
while BLM seeks to minimise the possibility of misattributing cause, AF seeks to 
omit cause altogether, and this is an important distinction.   
 
A second important distinction is that AF shifts the conceptual focus onto both 
withstanding KLJK LPSDFW µVXUSULVH¶ Hvents and benefitting from their occurrence. 
This distinction delineates AF as something more than an approach to enable 
protection IURP WKH ZRUVW HIIHFWV RI µQHJDWLYHO\-vaOHQFHG¶ HYHQWV ZKLOVW enabling 
benefit frRP µSRVLWLYHO\-YDOHQFHG¶ HYHQWV - suggested by Goodwin and Wright as 
perhaps the only way to deal with deep uncertainty [10 p.367]. 
 
We next present the main components of the AF approach, as developed by Taleb, 
and outline how these can be combined to constitute an approach that can either be 
implemented as a complement to scenario methodologies or as a standalone approach. 
7DOHE¶VRULJLQDOSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKH$)DSSURDFK [19] was a loose, qualitative account 
± as such, there exists no formal presentation of the AF approach to dealing with 
uncertainty, or the interlinks between the sub-concepts of µoptionality¶, µcontrolling 
the dispersion of outcomes¶, µEDUEHOO VWUDWHJ\¶ µhormesis¶, µredundancy¶, or µsmall-
scale experimentation¶. We will introduce AF in the next section and then expand on 
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the sub-concepts ± and our view of their usefulness in dealing with inderterminism ± 
after this. 
 
4.1 The nature of fragility and µantifragiliW\¶ 
 
Taleb [19] establishes the concept of µDQWLIUDJLOLW\¶ by juxtaposing it with the more 
IDPLOLDUWHUPRIµIUDJLOLW\¶$QWLIUDJLOLW\LV projected as the true antonym RIµIUDJLOLW\¶ 
rather than the antonym being µUREXVWQHVV¶ DV, at first glance, it appears to be. 
Robustness is, instead, an intermediate state on a continuum between fragility and 
antifragility (see Fig. 2) and simply implies an ability to withstand harm. Antifragility, 
by contrast, implies the capacity to gain from harm. 
 
   INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Fragility can be identified through a concave distribution of outcomes demonstrating 
exponentially increasing impairment (see Fig. 3) [19 p.272]. Under concavity, 
positive outcomes are minimal compared to the exponentially increasing level of 
negative outcomes that could occur. For example, travelling by plane has a concave 
distribution in terms of its EHQHILFLDORUQHJDWLYHHIIHFWVRQRQH¶VWLPH>19 p.283-284]. 
A plane will rarely be more than thirty minutes early but has the potential to be days 
late (or, even worse, not to arrive at all). The potential positive gains are minimal and 
have a ceiling (the time gains from early arrival on a flight scheduled to take two 
hours cannot be more than two hours) but the time you could lose is potentially 
unbounded (especially in the case of the most negative outcome of departure but non-
arrival). 
 
   INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE  
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This concave distribution comes about because of the nonlinear effect of harm [19 
p.270] and this non-linearity, in turn, provides a further useful way of identifying 
fragility in contrast to antifragility: fragility exists if the cumulative harm from small 
shocks is smaller than the harm from a single shock of a size equivalent to these 
cumulative small shocks [19 p.272]. For example, a porcelain cup can withstand 
numerous small impacts (for example, being dropped from a small height) but a single 
impact of a size equivalent to the sum of all the small impacts previously sustained 
will destroy the cup, which is therefore fragile. 
 
This concept of fragility, incorporated in AF, is of considerable relevance to our 
theme of dealing with uncertainty in the IRUPRI H[WUHPHRU µVXUSULVH¶ outcomes or 
events. The µfragile¶ organization is harmed considerably more by a single, extreme, 
high impact, µVXUSULVH¶ HYHQW WKDQ by a succession of small or intermediate-sized 
HYHQWV ,W LV IRU WKLV UHDVRQ WKDW ,/¶V GHILFLHQF\ LQ relation to such events is 
problematic - because of its focus on an explicit understanding of the underpinning 
causality of focal events. The occurrence of high-impact events that, a-priori, have no 
apparent cause is highly problematic if the outcome of the peripheral event is 
exponentially increasing harm to the organization. 
 
Taleb argues that the way to prepare for such KLJK LPSDFW µVXUSULVH¶ HYHQWV is to 
establish convexity LQ WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V H[SHULHQFH RI WKHLU RXWFRPHV. With 
convexity, the distribution of outcomes is benign ± the extent of the potential negative 
outcome is µclipped¶ - and possible positive outcomes are exponentially distributed 
(see Fig. 4). Experience of such a convex distribution of outcomes is, overall, 
positive. An example from the world of sport is the contracts of top-level football 
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coaches. Because football management is an inherently uncertain business it is 
customary for clauses to be inserted which require the employing club to pay off the 
full remaining years in the event of an early breaking of the contract that is not 
mutually agreed. So if he is fired the coach will get a large pay off and will still be 
free to seek employment elsewhere. Below, we outline methods for developing an 
organization¶Vexposure to such convex-distributed outcomes. 
 
   INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2 The value of creating Optionality 
 
A concept related to convexity - and incorporated inWR7DOHE¶V AF - is optionality. In 
the strategy literature, increasing optionality is analogous to building µIOH[LELOLW\¶ into 
the organization and its range of strategic options. µFlexibility¶ is also implied by the 
AF version of the concept but, under AF, optionality is additionally seen as the vector 
of antifragility [19 p.176] as it is through optionality that convexity is achieved. A 
simple example is provided by Taleb [19 p.177] in relation to the skewed laws 
pertaining to tenancy created in some US metropolitan areas in response to issues 
surrounding the HOHFWRUDWHV¶perceived insecurity of tenancies. This legislation obliges 
landlords to allow tenants to live in their rented apartments on a more-or-less 
permanent basis (i.e. until they decide to give up their tenancy) at a predictable rent. It 
skews the options in favour of the tenant because any large increases in costs (e.g., 
maintenance) are absorbed by the landlord rather than the tenant and if rents in the 
city should, generally, fall the tenant has the option of ending the rental agreement to 
secure a lower rent. The tenant therefore benefits from convexity ± his/her potential 
losses due to an increase in rent are minimal compared to the possible gains in the 
event that the rental market weakens. Note that it is not necessary to guess what will 
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cause an increase in WKHODQGORUG¶VFRVWV in order for the tenant to be antifragile in the 
IDFHRIWKHODQGORUG¶VLQFUHDVHGFRVWVRIOHWWLQJ. 
 
In relation to our earlier discussion of causation and determinism, the concept of 
optionality is important because it is one of the factors rendering AF a truly non-
deterministic, non-causal approach to preparation for the future. Optionality renders 
obsolete intelligence-gathering about the likelihood of future events [19]. It is a shield 
against our own fallibility in relation to both predicting causation of events and in 
guessing their outcomes. 
 
4.3 Controlling the dispersion of outcomes 
 
As is evident in step two of the BLM process discussed previously, extant planning 
methods can contain a stress-testing component designed to ascertain the extent to 
which plans are robust to deviations from what is expected - from the norm or 
µDYHUDJH¶ outcome. The AF approach asserts that such µsensitivity analysis¶ is 
problematic because of the implicit assumption that the magnitude of past events 
IURP ZKLFK WKH µQRUP¶ RU µDYHUDJH¶ LV usually estimated) is representative of the 
magnitude of events that have not yet happened. 
 
(YHQ ZKHQ µZorst-FDVH VFHQDULRV¶ are used for such stress testing they are usually 
sampled from the worst that has occurred in the past [19 p.45] and this may not 
represent the worst that will take place in the future. Attempts to avoid this problem 
by imagining HYHQ ZRUVH µZRUVW-case scenarios¶, or by imagining different, more 
extreme events that could potentially happen but have never yet occurred, remain 
problematic in IL applications. Cognitive psychology has shown that when asked to 
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imagine such events people fall back on the heuristics of recency, saliency and 
familiarity [32] with the result that such stress-testing tends to be limited to evaluating 
robustness against the last worst-case scenario, or prominent contemporary worries 
that are featured in the media $V 2¶%ULHQ >33] argued, in practice, participants in 
scenario planning workshops using the IL method tend to regularly emphasise 
economic factors ± such as exchange rates, interest rates, and the focal FRXQWU\¶V 
economic activity ± as uncertainties that are subsequently given prominence in the 
scenarios that are constructed. Also, recent and current media-emphasised concerns 
(e.g. of terrorism activities) tend, also, to replicate themselves in to-be-constructed 
VFHQDULRV2¶%ULHQODEHOOHGWKHVHSUDFWLFH-recognised issues as µfuture myopia¶.   
 
By contrast, an AF approach to the future renders stress testing against extreme 
futures irrelevant - since the focus of the AF approach is to actively position the 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V DFWLYLWLHV VXFK WKDW the downside outcome of any future event has a 
protective floor. In addition, organizational positioning within the AF approach also 
takes advantage of volatility in potential positive outcomes. Thus, dispersal of 
outcomes in terms of the upside of uncertainty is important but is seen as beneficial 
rather than problematic. 
 
4.4 Barbell strategy 
 
The dispersion of outcomes can be controlled through the adoption of barbell 
strategies [19 p.161-167], which are one example of convexity. The relation of the 
barbell strategy to the dispersion of outcomes is seen in that such strategies reject the 
FRQFHSWRIµPRGHUDWH¶RUµDYHUDJH¶ULVN DVLQFRUSRUDWHGLQµVWUHVVWHVWLQJ¶ and instead 
focus on taking no risks whatsoever in areas subject to potentially large-scale negative 
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outcomes and, in contrast, taking a lot of small risks in areas subject to potentially 
large-scale positive outcomes. 
 
A simple example of a barbell strategy related to personal finance is keeping 90% of 
funds in non-volatile cash deposits and the remaining 10% in very risky investments 
that have a small chance of a large payoff [19 p.161]. This well illustrates the 
convexity of barbell strategies as the potential losses can only ever amount to 10% of 
total funds whereas the potential gains are very large.  
 
4.5 Hormesis 
 
Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of AF compared to other approaches to prepare for 
the future that also emphasise indeterminism [34], or compared to IL and BLM, is its 
incorporation of WKHFRQFHSWRIµKRUPHVLV¶+RUPHVLVLVGHILQHG>19 p.37] in relation 
to toxicology, as a small dose of a harmful substance that is actually beneficial to the 
organism [35]. The analogy is inoculation - by subjecting an organism to a small dose 
of an illness it will become better able to resist that illness in the future. 
 
Hormesis has relatively recently risen to prominence once more through the work of 
Calbrese and Baldwin [36]. Here, the hormetic process within the human body can be 
used to inoculate people at risk of exposure to a dangerous substance so as to be more 
resistant to it should life-threatening exposure occur ± for example, rescue workers 
who clear up after a nuclear accident could be exposed to low levels of radiation in 
their training in order to build up their resistance levels [35]. Resistance is generated 
by the fact that an organism exposed to toxins tends to overcompensate its response, 
thereby building immunity to future exposure.  
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The hormesis concept, as incorporated in AF, emphasises that the removal or absence 
of stressors can be detrimental, even if it appears to be beneficial in the short term. An 
example is the smoothing of the business cycle that took place during the so-called 
µJUHDWPRGHUDWLRQ¶RIWKHVDQGV, lasting until the credit crunch. During this 
period of pro-longed, continuous expansion (amounting to some 63 quarters of 
unbroken growth in the UK) any natural contraction that might have occurred
1
 was 
µVPRRWKHG¶DZD\WKURugh ultra low interest rates2, leading to a large-scale expansion 
of credit. In the short term, this financial stability appeared beneficial since it 
appeared that the vagaries of the business cycle had been removed permanently. In 
actuality, however, in the longer run, this short-term stability gain resulted in a storing 
up of financial contractions into a single, large and very damaging crunch that the UK 
had, over time, become increasingly unprepared for. 
 
While this latter example is at the macroeconomic level, the concept of hormesis is of 
direct relevance to organizations that attempt to remove variation and error ± error 
that may, in fact, contribute to an organization¶V HYROXWLRQDU\ VWUHQJWKHQLQJ The 
benefits of stressors to an organization¶V,7VHFXULW\V\VWHPVis one obvious example 
± since the continual occurrence of external attacks on I.T. systems acts to strengthen 
the capability to withstand future attacks.  
 
The concept of hormesis, as applied to organizations, can be viewed as evolutionary 
in nature - increasing the organization¶V DGDSWDWLRQ WR WKH FKDQJLQJ HQYLURQPHQW
making it fitter and better able to survive [35 p.679]. Pech and Oakley [35] have 
                                                 
1
 For example, as a result of the bursting of the dotcom bubble around 2000. 
2
 At least in terms of what was the norm at that time, if not in terms of what has been seen 
subsequently. 
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discussed this evolutionary viewpoint by reference to the work of Greiner [37], 
suggesting that the evolutionary crises that mark an organization¶VGHYHORSPHQWFDQ
be seen as resulting from a failure to inoculate, through hormesis, at an earlier stage of 
development. Hormesis is distinct from existing conceptualisations of organizational 
learning since it implies an additional, strengthened, level of adaptation that could not 
simply take place through learning alone [35 p.679]. 
 
This, organization-level, application of the concept of hormesis is identified by Pech 
and Oakley [35] as being present in well-known organizations, including Johnson & 
Johnson, Kodak and Xerox. Perhaps the most salient lesson that they draw is that 
managers may µRYHUSURWHFW¶ WKeir organizations, thereby risking both longer-term 
development and adaptation for the sake of short-term tranquillity. Empirical 
evidence of these effects is still being collected but could come in the form of the 
survival life-spans of large corporations. For example, it has been shown by de Geus 
[38] that less than 50% of the ZRUOG¶VODUJHVWfirms of fifty years ago still exist today. 
A future important avenue of research could examine the extent to which 
organizational death results from the removal of stressors.  
 
4.6 Redundancy 
 
Within AF, the concept of hormesis is related to that of redundancy. The potential 
benefits of redundancy are well known and documented - for example in the buffering 
actions of firms in relation to maintaining stocks of supplies. However, the concept of 
redundancy, as incorporated in AF, is more than this and places additional emphasis 
on the possibility of gaining from ± not just defending against - uncertainty. In AF, 
redundancy is seen as a form of investment rather than a defensive strategy [19 p.44]. 
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For example, in the event of large-VFDOHKLJKO\LPSDFWIXOµVXUSULVH¶HYHQWVsuch as a 
cessation of world supply of a particular material, excess resources held as a buffer by 
an organization can be sold ± thus, in principle, there can be a gain, rather than loss, 
IURPµVXUSULVH¶HYHQWV 
 
One of the most important lessons for preparation for an uncertain future using an AF 
approach is to avoid chasing out of the organization the compensations that arise 
naturally as a result of hormesis. As discussed above, the concept of hormesis implies 
that over-compensation occurs within the organism (or organization) as a result of 
exposure to small amounts of harm. These overcompensations, should they be 
allowed to continue existing, result in a greater ability to resist the same source or 
class of harm in the future. Thus, this form of redundancy is beneficial ± but in the 
long-run rather than the short-run. 
 
By contrast, in contemporary practice, the increasing sophistication of supply-chain 
management techniques and the extensive use of technologies such as enterprise-
resource planning have acted to remove redundancy in organizational routines. Error-
reduction methods such as Six Sigma also act to reduce redundancy. But, as we have 
seen, from the viewpoint of hormesis, redundancy is D V\VWHP¶VQDWXUDOO\-occurring 
response to the experience of small doses of volatility and is therefore beneficial. In 
the organizational context, a long period in which no errors occur (because they have 
been chased out of the system) will degrade any future response to error.  
 
Similarly, under the AF approach to uncertainty, efficiency is seen as synonymous 
with fragility. The driving-out of inefficiencies in organizations creates tight coupling 
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between systems, for example between individuals on a team or stages in a production 
process. This tight coupling can lead to cascade effects if something, somewhere in 
the chain, goes wrong. The ripple effect through the system can result in the 
exponentially increasing harm that is a feature of the concave distribution of outcomes 
that is associated with fragility. Finkelstein [50 p.164-168] for example shows how a 
drive for efficiency went too far in the Japanese company Snow Brand Foods, leading 
to a disastrous outcome. Similarly, in project management, the removal of slack in 
delivery dates for the individual tasks comprising an overall project can result in 
almost every aspect of the project lying RQ WKH µFULWLFDOSDWK¶ - such that any delay, 
anywhere, jeopardises the overall completion of the project by the specified date. 
 
A further implication of an AF redundancy analysis is that organizations should avoid 
excessive amounts of debt, which, from the perspective of AF, is the inverse of 
redundancy [19 p.44]. For any organization, perhaps especially a relative new, small 
firm, fluid financial resources give cover over the volatility in performance of the 
firm. Debt, on the other hand, increases vulnerability to volatility ± since a small 
variation in performance can prevent the firm from servicing its debt and cause it to 
become bankrupt. 
 
4.7 Small-scale experimentation (trial and error) 
 
According to the AF perspective, randomness in the occurrence of events and their 
outcomes, whether resulting from our epistemological inadequacies or from 
RQWRORJLFDORUµWUXH randomness¶, does considerably less damage when it is distributed 
over time than when it is concentrated [19 p.91]. This analysis implies that 
organizations should break up investments into small-scale experiments that test the 
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market before committing to larger-scale investments. Similarly, organizations can 
increase antifragility by creating several business units producing different products 
and ensuring that the markets for their products are only minimally related. 
 
However, there is a trade-off here that has been overlooked within the AF 
conceptualisation and which may be problematic for some organizations. Running a 
number of small-scale business units producing different products rather than a single 
business unit producing one product may result in greater antifragility, but this 
antifragility may be acquired at the expense of lower specialisation and, therefore, 
lower productivity and profit in a µnormal¶ operating environment. The same trade-off 
is in evidence in the previous discussion of redundancy ± efficiency increases 
productivity and may also increase fragility. However, increases in productivity over 
the short-term will count for nothing if the organization is then destroyed by lessened 
antifragility over the long-term. 
 
4.8 Anti-Fragile concepts and alternative approaches to decision making under 
uncertainty 
 
An important characteristic of AF is that the sub-components that we have discussed 
interlink with each other, thereby providing the potential of a complete and internally-
consistent approach to dealing with uncertainty. For example, there is a crossover 
between small-scale experimentation and optionality, with the former effectively 
facilitating the latter. In discussing the usefulness or othHUZLVH RI µUHDO RSWLRQV
UHDVRQLQJ¶- a decision-making approach with much similarity to the optionality sub-
component of AF - Barnett and Dunbar [39, p.384] draw on Myers [40] to make the 
simple but nonetheless crucial point that scaling up investment in particular projects 
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incrementally provides decision-making options at each incremental point. An initial 
small-scale, experimental investment can secure WKHµRSWLRQ¶later to either continue a 
particular project or discontinue it upon maturity (upon completion of the first-stage 
of the project/experimentation). For example, in 1997, Merck signed an agreement 
with Biogen for Biogen to develop an asthma drug. The agreement involved the 
scheduled payment of µstage payments¶ over several years, during which the actual 
VXFFHVV RI WKH GUXJ¶V GHYHORSPHQW E\ %LRJHQ WKH VWDWH RI WKH GUXJ PDUNHW VDIHW\
rules, and so on, could all change. The stage payments allowed Merck to retain the 
option, at each stage, either to µscale up¶ or to µabandon¶ further involvement in the 
GUXJ¶V GHYHORSPHQW 7KXV 0HUFN¶V XSVLGH ZDV XQOLPLWHG DQG LWV GRZQVLGH ZDV
capped by the advance payment made to Biogen. Similarly, Cornelius et al. [41] give 
the example of an oil and gas company that discovered large amounts of natural gas 
underground in West Africa in the early 1990s, at which time the retail price that 
could be charged for gas (lower than current prices) meant that its extraction was not 
viable. However, since that time the natural gas price in both the US and Europe has 
more than doubled, and the option is now a valuable asset to the company. 
 
In contrast to optionality and real options reasoning, µeffectuation¶ has been discussed 
in the entrepreneurship literature. Effectuation is a dynamic way of making decisions 
± here, the decision-maker is viewed as adaptive to emerging circumstances and also 
tries to remove risk by alliances with powerful others ± i.e., clipping the downside of 
the possible outcomes of actions taken, keeping options open, etc. Within AF, the 
search for positions that have a concave distribution of outcomes is in line with this 
GHVFULSWLRQ RI WKH HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V intuitive way of making sound decisions. The 
FRQFHSW RI µHIIHFWXDWLRQ¶ RULJLQDWHV LQ WKH ZRUN RI 6DUDVYDWK\ >42@ µ%ULFRODJH¶ DV
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discussed in particular by Baker and Nelson [43], is a similar concept which, in fact, 
features withLQ7DOHE¶VH[SRVLWLRQRI$)>SSSSS@ 
 
According to Fisher [44, p.1020], successful entrepreneurs tend to focus on what they 
are willing to lose in making a decision about whether or not to pursue an opportunity. 
In other words, Fisher views entrepreneurs as adopting a convexity-based approach to 
decision making under uncertainty, as in AF. Empirical evidence for effectuation and 
bricolage as underpinning success in entrepreneurial decision making can also be 
taken as evidence for the potential usefulness of an AF approach, or at least the 
convexity-based aspect of it. A number of studies have carried out empirical testing of 
the concept of bricolage and shown it to be a useful concept for describing how firms 
operate, evidencing varying degrees of beneficial effect on firm performance [45-47]. 
Sarasvathy [48] has provided empirical evidence related to effectuation through a 
study of 27 entrepreneurs and cites a number of other empirical studies illustrating its 
beneficial effect on subsequent business performance. 
 
In summary, there exists no formal presentation of the AF approach to dealing with 
uncertainty, or the inter-linkages between the sub-concepts of AF. However, the value 
RI HDFK RI $)¶V sub-components of µoptionality¶, µcontrolling the dispersion of 
outcomes¶, µEDUEHOO VWUDWHJ\¶ µhormesis¶, µredundancy¶, and µsmall-scale 
experimentation¶ as ways of improving decision making in the face of uncertainty 
about the future are supported, to a degree, by extant research evidence.  
 
We see AF as either a standalone method or as a complement to standard scenario-
planning approaches. We consider it a better complement for BLM than for IL 
 27 
because under IL there is a danger that participants will be seduced by the plausibility 
of their constructed cause-and-effect scenarios and this may act against the benefits of 
AF. While this is true of BLM too to a degree, the fully-augmented BLM approach 
already contains mechanisms by which to weaken the emphasis on cause, such as a 
consideration of stakeholder motivations. AF takes this dilution of cause, already 
present in BLM, further by then considering future outcomes without recourse to 
cause. 
 
When used as a complement to BLM the AF approach allows the organization to 
place itself in a position to benefit from the unexpected. BLM widens the range of 
futures considered compared to IL. The AF approach then allows organizations to 
actively prepare for futures it has not and cannot (because of indeterminism and the 
fallibility of causal assumptions) consider as part of BLM process. In the next section, 
we provide practical guidelines to implement the AF approach within a management 
workshop setting. 
 
5. Implementation of an AF approach in a workshop setting 
 
5.1 Three-step process 
 
In order to aid preparation for the future within a scenario planning workshop, we 
advocate a three-step process to analyse and document an organization¶V IUDJLOLW\ to 
events and outcomes not modelled in a scenario analysis and, further, to consider 
ways to enhance antifragility: 
 
Step 1) Listing of the organization¶VFXUUHQWVWUDWHJies/ investments. 
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Workshop participants are required at this stage to produce generic names for their 
organization¶V strategies and to write them at the top of a piece of paper, followed 
underneath by a short description summarising the strategy. An example could be 
Morrisons¶ (a large UK supermarket) recent decision to enter the online market in 
which their main rivaOV VXFK DV 7HVFR DQG 6DLQVEXU\¶V DUH DOUHDG\ SURPLQHQW This 
strategy might be ODEHOOHGµ2QOLQHUHWDLO¶DQGWKHVKRUWGHVFULSWLRQFRXOGEHµ7RHQWHU
WKH PDUNHW IRU WKH RQOLQH UHWDLO DQG PRELOH GHOLYHU\ RI JURFHULHV¶ Next, the 
participants (comprised, in our hypothetical example, of Morrisons¶ senior 
management team) would then go on to the second step. 
 
Step 2) Categorising a focal strategy or investment on a continuum between 
µfragile¶ and µantifragile¶. 
This stage involves consideration of the convexity or concavity of the outcomes that 
could be associated with the strategy or investment under consideration by 
considering the possible distribution of positive and negative payoffs - regardless of 
underpinning events or causes. 
 
The focus of the AF approach is on clipping possible downside losses and exposing 
the organization to potential upside gains. This is achieved by answering the five 
questions, detailed below, in relation to the focal strategy/investment.  
 
Participants are facilitated in using their answers to these five questions to negotiate 
and agree on where the considered strategy/investment should be placed on a 
continuum from µfragile¶ to µantifragile¶.  
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The questions within Step 2 are: 
 
i) Does the proposed strategy/investment render the organization vulnerable to great 
harm? 
There may be core aspects to an organization¶V DFWLYLWLHV WKDW are very sensitive to 
harm $Q H[DPSOH PLJKW EH *RRJOH¶V FRUH DFWLYLW\ RI SURYLGLQJ IUHH-to-use search 
engines for internet users. If this aspect of its business were to become somehow 
devalued - perhaps because the results produced by its search engines had become 
commercialised to the extent that they were no longer considered unbiased - this 
would have a very large-scale, deleterious impact on Google and may even jeopardise 
its continued existence. On the other hand, strategic change in some aspects of 
*RRJOH¶s business - such as the production of operating systems for smart phones, or 
its design and production of tablet computers - may produce little exposure to 
harming the core of Google. Within the latter activities, it may be possible to take 
greater strategic ULVNVZLWKRXWMHRSDUGLVLQJWKHFRPSDQ\¶VH[LVWHQFH 
 
Answers to this question facilitate a consideration as to which end of the antifragile 
µEDUEHOO¶ > S-167, and discussed earlier] a particular strategy/investment is 
located. Is it at the end in which no risks should be taken, whatsoever, or is it at the 
end in which risks can be taken as long as the potential losses can be easily 
withstood? This consideration primes participants for the following questions: 
 
ii) Is there a cut-off point to potential losses? 
In the example of WKH µEDUEHOO VWUDWHJ\¶ IRU personal finance, discussed earlier, 
maximum losses could only ever be 10% of total funds. Consideration as to what may 
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cause such a loss is not of relevance in the antifragile approach. In considering 
answers to the second question of Step 2, participants consider the potential scale of 
losses associated with a particular strategy or a particular investment. 
 
iii) Are these potential losses of a magnitude that can easily be withstood by the 
business, without jeopardising its existence? What is the magnitude of  potential 
ORVVHVLQFRPSDULVRQWRWKHFRPSDQ\¶VFDVKUHVHUYHV" 
As an insightful example to the purpose of this question, consider the state of the 
balance sheets of banks in the UK at the point of the recent credit crunch. The total 
value of loans made by the UK banks at that point-in-time were huge multiples of 
their cash reserves. As a result of widespread defaults, the UK banks owed more to 
other banks and organizations than their actual cash reserves. Under normal 
circumstances businesses in similar situations would fail through bankruptcy. The 
third question of Step 2 is designed to raise awareness of this possibility. 
 
iv) If the focal investment/strategy were to be expanded, would the potential losses: 
 a) remain of a similar size? 
b) increase in proportion with the increase in potential gains? 
c) increase at a rate considerably slower than the increase in potential gains? 
d) increase at a rate considerably faster than the increase in potential gains? 
 
The purpose of this fourth question of Step 2 is to try to identify the potential for 
increasing potential gains in comparison to the potential for increasing potential 
losses. The focus is on whether potential losses can be clipped at the same time as 
potential gains are unbounded. 
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If convexity is present in a strategy or investment, we might expect an extension of 
the focal investment or strategy to result in relatively unchanged potential losses but 
greatly enhanced potential gains. Or, perhaps, potential losses may increase at a rate 
far slower than potential gains and may still contain a cut-off point. Ideally, potential 
gains will be unlimited. 
 
v) Are the potential losses associated with the focal investment/strategy de-coupled 
from the potential losses of other currently-followed strategies, or other investments? 
 
If an organization¶V DFWLYLWLHV DUH FRUUHODWHG IRU H[DPSOH LI GHPDQG for more than 
one RI WKH ILUP¶V products is from a similar segment of the market) then losses 
associated with the focal strategy/investment may occur at the same time as losses as 
a result of other, currently-followed, strategies/investments. It is important, therefore, 
to consider the scale of losses not only in relation to the considered 
strategy/investment but also in interaction with other strategies/investments. Whilst a 
particular strategy or investment may have a clipped downside - and so may not have 
the potential to bring down the entire organization - the simultaneous failure of 
multiple strategies/investments, whether clipped or not, could risk the entire 
organization. The fifth question of Step 2 is aimed at uncovering the extent of 
potential correlated loss - and addresses the redundancy/buffering aspect of 
antifragility. 
 
Discussion of answers to these five questions within Step 2 will enable workshop 
participants to place the focal strategy/investment on the continuum between fragility 
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and antifragility. In Step 3, below, participants move on to consider how to create 
greater antifragility into the focal strategy/investment. 
 
Step 3) Considering how the focal strategy/investment can be made more 
antifragile. 
In the first part of this step, participants are given a brief presentation on each of the 
five factors associated with JUHDWHU DQWLIUDJLOLW\ µ2SWLRQality¶ µ%DUEHOO¶
µ5HGXQGDQF\EXIIHULQJ¶µ+RUPHVLV¶DQGµ%ULFRODJH¶ These are the methods by which 
the dispersion of outcomes can be controlled and losses clipped, as described earlier, 
while potential gains are unbounded. 
 
In the second part of this step, each participant works alone or in pairs. Participants 
are asked to develop one example of how the focal strategy/objective can be made 
more antifragile, by considering each of the five factors in turn. In the final part of this 
step, ideas are pooled. 
 
2QH SDUWLFLSDQW¶V set of examples UHODWHG WR 0RUULVRQV¶ YHQWXUH LQWR WKH RQOLQH
grocery retail market, described earlier, might be as follows: 
 
Optionality: Lease rather than buy delivery vehicles, at least for an 
initial period. If the service is not successful, cancel the 
lease. 
Barbell: Offer the service by utilising the online and distribution 
services of another organization, thus sharing risk and 
gaining from their expertise - in fact, this is exactly 
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what Morrisons did by agreeing an alliance with the 
online retailer Ocado. 
Redundancy/buffering: Have separate warehouses/depots for the developing 
online business, so as not to hazard the functioning of 
the supply chain to the existing store-based business - 
currently core to Morrisons¶ success formula. This 
might also be considered a Barbell strategy as it seeks to 
isolate the risks within the new venture so as not to 
affect the core business. 
Hormesis: Use the new online service to switch supplies between 
neighbouring retail stores or to replenish smaller, local 
stores which experience high turnover of particular 
items, in order to simulate and prepare for periods of 
extremely high demand. 
Bricolage: Offer the new online service in one region only, 
initially. Or, offer online a sub-set of products currently 
sold in-store (i.e., not the full range available in-store). 
 
5.2 Optional forth step: stakeholder analysis/ethical considerations 
 
Because the fully-augmented version of BLM includes an analysis of stakeholder 
motivations [49], implementing an AF approach as a complement to BLM could 
allow for a consideration of the ethical aspects of the proposed methods for achieving 
convexity. This optional fourth step of our proposed AF process considers whether 
the organization is seeking to achieve greater antifragility by displacing its own 
fragility onto other organizations or stakeholders. For example, an organization can 
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achieve a degree of convexity by placing employees on short-term or µ]HUR KRXUV¶
contracts or by using market power to force supplying organizations to bear the costs 
associated with unpredictable demand for a product or service. These practices may 
render the focal organization more antifragile but only by rendering employees, or 
linked organizations, more fragile. By considering the options for achieving 
antifragility alongside a stakeholder analysis, consideration can be given to the 
desirability, ethicality and sustainability of the organization¶V YDULRXV RSWLRQV IRU
achieving antifragility. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The rapidly increasing complexity of the challenges to which modern organizations 
are subjected far outpaces the ability to uncover cause, and renders causal guesses 
provisional, tentative and subject to error. It is therefore, in our view, increasingly 
important that the methods we use to prepare for the future can cope with the 
uncertainty brought about by this increasing complexity without relying solely on 
identifying cause. Most organizations currently employing scenario planning use the 
basic intuitive logics scenario method but, as we have argued, the backwards logic 
derivative method carries the benefit of considering the causes of extreme changes in 
the achievemHQWRI DQRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VNH\ REMHFWLYHV7KLVSRVLWLYH DVSHFW KRZHYHU
will still leave the organization vulnerable to µsurprise¶ events that can have extreme 
negative outcomes but that had no, a-priori, obvious causality. 7DOHE¶V DQWLIUDJLOLW\
conceptualisation ± as we have developed and applied it ± provides a complementary, 
or perhaps a complete alternative, approach to dealing with future uncertainty. As 
such, it enables the decision-maker to actively respond to a very broad range of 
futures by explicitly embracing indeterminism. Actual events and their outcomes may, 
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of course, be subject to determinism in reality but, given our limited capacity to 
uncover this determinism, we are better off assuming indeterminism and making our 
preparations on this basis. In short, our guesses as to causes and their outcomes can 
not be misplaced if we do not make any.  
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